deur Udo Karsten
Die unitariër Jaco van Zyl [1] het onlangs gereageer op my artikel Jesus was ‘n gewone mens. Ek wys hiermee graag op Van Zyl se deurlopende mistastings en onsimpatieke lees van my artikel.
Reg van die staanspoor af word daar verwys na “baie mense, ook ortodokse Christene.” Dit is altyd interessant hoe groepsoriëntasie in apologetiese skrywes uitgedruk word. “Christen” is nie hier genoeg nie; “ortodokse Christen” is ‘n noodsaaklike verbetering want dit is hulle wat die ware en regte Jesus beet het. En met “ortodoks” word daar nie “Ortodoks” bedoel nie – want die skrywer sal baie gou die leerstellings en tradisies van Ortodokse Christendom uitwys as nie-ortodoks. “Ortodoks” word hier met baie vryheid gebruik om te verwys na die dogma en tradisie wat vervat is in wat Calvinisme geformuleer en geërf het. (Seshonderd jaar gelede sou so ‘n Protestante Christen-stroom as alles behalwe “ortodoks” beskryf word. Maar soos bykans alle godsdiens-stryde, word daar aan alle kante aanspraak gemaak dat hulle geloofsleer die ware een is; min ander woorde word dan meer los-en-vas gebruik as ortodoks.)
Die skrywer brei dan sy antwoord uit ten gunste van sy gekose “ortodoksie”…
Dis ironies gegewe die kritiek waarmee Van Zyl met die deur in die huis val dat hy dit nodig vind om op sy blog te spesifiseer dat hy ‘n onortodokse Christen is. [2] Hy jaag egter hier stof op oor “hoe groepsoriëntasie in apologetiese skrywes uitgedruk word” en suggereer dat my en ander se gebruik van die term ortodokse Christene op ‘n tipe meerderwaardigheid moet dui waarmee sulke Christene klaarblyklik diegene wat nie “die ware en regte Jesus beet het” nie, bloot van die tafel wil afvee. Met so ‘n oorylde aanname en veralgemening skroom Van Zyl nie net om my intensies in die slegste moontlike lig te stel nie, maar gee hy verder die uiters aanmatigende verduideliking dat ““Ortodoks” hier met baie vryheid gebruik [word] om te verwys na die dogma en tradisie wat vervat is in wat Calvinisme geformuleer en geërf het.”
Dit wek natuurlik besonderse agterdog as ‘n mens ervaar hoe iemand anders sy eie aannames met groot selfversekerdheid as jou standpunt verkoop. In die konteks van die vraag oor die identiteit van Jesus het my verwysing na ortodokse Christene gedui op ‘n vereenselwiging met wat Christene in die opstel van belydenisse sedert die vroeë kerk geglo het (dus spesifiek oor God se drie-enige aard en Jesus se Goddelike natuur). ‘n Unitariër soos Van Zyl kan gerus protesteer oor die skriftuurlike onderbou en/of filosofiese samehang van die Drie-eenheidsleer, soos hy inderdaad met groot passie en woordepraal oral op die web doen. Die punt is egter dat wat die vroeë kerk met die opstel van hul belydenisse [3] geglo het, ‘n algemene en aanvaarbare verstaan is van wat met ortodoks [4] bedoel word – dis nie maar net my “gekose” ortodoksie soos Van Zyl opmerk nie.
En nee, ek maak my nie skuldig aan ‘n drogredenasie soos Van Zyl later in sy beoordeling insinueer nie. Ek beroep my nie op tradisie deur te sê dat omdat die vroeë kerkvaders iets gesê het, dit daarom outomaties die waarheid is nie; ek dui bloot aan uit tradisie dat wat gesê is, die grense gevorm het vir ortodoksie soos dit in die vroegste belydenisse verwoord is.
Van Zyl het duidelik nie belanggestel om die kat eers uit die boom te kyk nie, en dit toe maar aan die stert beetgekry. Want met ortodoks het ek beslis nie na “die dogma en tradisie wat vervat is in wat Calvinisme geformuleer en geërf het” verwys nie. Ek verwerp inderdaad, soos Van Zyl antisipeer, sekere praktyke en leringe van 16de eeuse Protestantisme. So byvoorbeeld is dit eenvoudig wandadig en onverskoonbaar om ander se menswaardigheid aan te tas (Luther se anti-Semitisme) of op brandstapels te verbrand en te onthoof vir hul sienings (Calvyn se toeskouersrol in Servetus se dood). Ek is ook nie ‘n aanhanger van Calvinisme nie; nie in my soteriologie of voorsienigheidsbeskouing nie. (Terloops, daar is geen dispuut dat ortodokse Christene regdeur die geskiedenis onverdraagsaam opgetree het nie en alle voorbeelde daarvan is verdoemenswaardig. Maar sulke onverdraagsame optrede is geen funksie of inherente implikasie van Christelike ortodoksie nie.)
Van Zyl het skynbaar aspirasies as ‘n gedagteleser of dalk projekteer hy maar net sy eie bagasie op wat hy lees. Hy probeer sy uiterste bes om my mooi netjies te etiketteer soos wanneer hy later wéér verkeerdelik verwys na my “eg-Calvinistiese lae beskouing van menslikheid.” Ek vind hierdie voorbarigheid taamlik vermetel.
Die skrywer brei dan sy antwoord uit ten gunste van sy gekose “ortodoksie” deur eerstens te antwoord op Esterhuyse se verwysing na Jesus se “geboortelike en byna biologiese verhouding as God se Seun.” Hy betwyfel dat enige “gerespekteerde teoloog” al gepraat het van “Jesus se biologiese verbintenis met God,” en gee dan die standaard, amptelik-aanvaarde geloofstelling van die Kerk sedert die Vyfde Eeu, naamlik “dat Jesus in sy persoon volledig die Goddelike natuur deelagtig was, net soos hy ook volledig ‘n menslike natuur deelagtig was.” “In die Christologie word dit [so] gestel,” sê hy, asof daar eintlik net een manier is wat ‘n mens dit kan en mag sê.
Ek moet uitwys dat Esterhuyse verwys na ‘n byna biologiese verhouding as God se seun. En Esterhuyse se stelling is beslis nie van die merk af nie. In een van sy polemiese werke oor die Konsilie van Nicea en die Ariese Geskil, maak Athanasius herhaaldelik uitgebreide analogieë oor hoe die Seun in dieselfde aard of natuur van die Vader deel juis omdat hy seun is en verwek word deur die Vader (De Decretis II.3, III.13, V.19-24, VI.25, VII.28, 30, 31). Deur selektief gebruik te maak van sekere raakpunte wat met biologiese verwekking geassosieer word, het Athanasius vanuit sy eie nie-Joodse paradigma sy dogma van “Goddelike verwekking van die Seun” geformuleer. ‘n Byna biologiese verhouding as God se seun? Ongetwyfeld. En Esterhuyse se waarneming is daarom korrek.
Van Zyl wil uitwys dat Esterhuyse se stelling darem genuanseerd is, want hy praat dan van Jesus se “byna” biologiese verhouding as God se seun, so asof ek nie tussen die reëls lees nie en Esterhuyse onnodig vlak kyk. Maar Esterhuyse se onderrok hang uit wanneer hy vir ‘n tweede keer in dieselfde paragraaf verwys na “Jesus se biologiese verbintenis met God”. Esterhuyse skep ‘n karikatuur, selfs al probeer Van Zyl hom verdedig deur te probeer aandui dat ander darem ook so in biologiese terme oor Jesus as die Seun gedink het. Die ironie is dat hy deur hom op Athanasius te beroep bloot bevestig dat Esterhuyse wel ‘n karikatuur skep waarvan sy gebruik van die woord “byna” hom nie red nie.
In sy brief in verdediging van die Niceáanse definisie maak Athanasius inderdaad gebruik van analogieë om aan te dui dat die Seun in dieselfde natuur van die Vader deel. Die punt is egter dat dit bloot analogieë is en daarom is Athanasius versigtig genoeg om pertinent te noem, in die einste gedeeltes waarna Van Zyl verwys, dat niemand oor God in fisiese, liggaamlike terme moet dink of dat die verhouding tussen mense, soos tussen seuns en ouers, presies vergelykbaar is met die verhouding tussen die Seun en die Vader nie:
“For bodies which are like each other may be separated and become at distances from each other, as are human sons relatively to their parents (as it is written concerning Adam and Seth, who was begotten of him that he was like him after his own pattern Genesis 5:3); but since the generation of the Son from the Father is not according to the nature of men, and not only like, but also inseparable from the essence of the Father, and He and the Father are one, as He has said Himself, and the Word is ever in the Father and the Father in the Word, as the radiance stands towards the light (for this the phrase itself indicates), therefore the Council, as understanding this, suitably wrote ‘one in essence,’ that they might both defeat the perverseness of the heretics, and show that the Word was other than originated things.” (De Decretis V.20)
“…but let them reflect, that in thus considering they utter two blasphemies; for they make God corporeal, and they falsely say that the Lord is not Son of the very Father, but of what is about Him.” (De Decretis V.22)
“Further, let every corporeal reference be banished on this subject; and transcending every imagination of sense, let us, with pure understanding and with mind alone, apprehend the genuine relation of son to father, and the Word’s proper relation towards God, and the unvarying likeness of the radiance towards the light: for as the words ‘Offspring’ and ‘Son’ bear, and are meant to bear, no human sense, but one suitable to God, in like manner when we hear the phrase ‘one in essence,’ let us not fall upon human senses, and imagine partitions and divisions of the Godhead, but as having our thoughts directed to things immaterial, let us preserve undivided the oneness of nature and the identity of light; for this is proper to a son as regards a father, and in this is shown that God is truly Father of the Word.” (De Decretis V.24)
‘n Byna biologiese verhouding as God se seun? Nie eers byna nie. Maar die leser kan gerus self Van Zyl se verwysings naslaan [5] en tot sy of haar eie gevolgtrekking kom.
“‘Seun van God’…dui eenvoudig op ‘n spesifieke verhoudingsdinamika,”sê Udo Karsten. Dis waar, maar weereens is dit ook hier waar die glibberige helling van na-bybelse verwysingsrame die inhoud van daardie “verhoudingsdinamika” bepaal met allerhande komplekse metafisiese formules. Feit is dat seun van God ‘n Eerste-Eeuse Hebraïese betekenis gehad het en dat die konsep geheel binne eietydse Sitz im Leben gebruik is. Dit is híér waar die seun-van-God-konsep volgens Jesus en sy Joodse volgelinge wêreldwyd verskil van die Seun van God volgens Athanasius en sy Grieks-Romeinse Kerk. Die onversoenbaarheid van die twee konsepte word raak opgesom deur wyle Geza Vermes:
Dit is tog noodsaaklik om te beklemtoon dat een betekenis nooit [hiermee] betuig word nie omdat dit onversoenbaar is met Joodse monoteïsme. Dit is die nie-metaforiese, selfs letterlike gebruik van ‘Seun van God,’ wat nie soseer die draer se nabyheid met God weens uitverkiesing impliseer nie, maar sy werklike deelagtigheid in die Goddelike natuur. So ‘n begrip, hoe algemeen ookal in die omliggende Grieks-Romeinse en Oosterse beskawings, was en word steeds deur Jode van alle eras, van Bybeltye tot op hede, as lasterlik beskou. [1]
Die verderde sofistikering van die Seun-van-God-konsep deur die nie-Hebraïese kerk, (dink maar aan konsepte soos perichorese, Hipostatiese Eenheid , Ewige Verwekking, ens.) was bloot ‘n onomkeerbare voortsetting van ‘n pragmatiese breuk wat eeue vroeër deur nie-Joodse (selfs anti-Semitiese) Kervaders aan die gang gesit is.
Van Zyl volhard met sy irriterende aanduidings van hoe ek oor sekere terme sou dink. Dis seker omdat baie skeptici diep onder die indruk is dat dit eenvoudig wedersyds uitsluitend is om ‘n robuuste konseptuele begrip van die drie-enige Goddelike natuur te hê (en dus van Seun van God as tweede persoon van die Drie-eenheid), maar terselfdertyd ook ‘n kultuur-historiese sensitiwiteit te hê vir hoe die term Seun van God in die antieke Joodse milieu gebruik is. Met sulke sensitiwiteit sal iemand byvoorbeeld bewus wees dat Seun van God eintlik selde die konnotasie met eksplisiete Goddelikheid gehad het en in verskillende kontekste gebruik is. [6] Tog is dit die manier waarop sekere terme in spesifieke kontekste [7] in die Nuwe Testament voorkom wat Christologiese implikasies het [8]. Dis waarom iemand soos Marcus Borg, wat die ortodokse verstaan van die Inkarnasie en Drie-eenheid verwerp [9], uitwys dat “selfs voor die evangelies neergeskryf is, is gebede tot Jesus gerig asof tot God, en gesange het Jesus as goddelik geprys” en dat “[t]een die vroeë tweede eeu, kon Ignatius praat van ‘ons God, Jesus Christus’.” [10]
Dit is dus die Joodse gebruik van Seun van God sélf wat ‘n baie spesifieke verhoudingsdinamika omskryf. Ben Witherington wys op die volgende:
It is true that sometimes angels were called sons of God (see Gen. 6:2), but when Jews thought about a son of God they normally thought of a king anointed by God. For example, it is perfectly clear in Psalm 2 that the discussion is about the Davidic king who has been anointed by the high priest and thereby coronated as king. “The kings of the earth take their stand / and the rulers gather together / Against the Lord / and against his Anointed One… The Lord scoffs at them…’I have installed my King / on Zion, my holy hill.’” Then the king himself declares, “I will proclaim the decree of the Lord…You are My Son; today I have become your Father. / Ask of me, / and I will make the nations your inheritance” (Ps. 2:2-8 NIV). These last verses should be familiar since they are quoted in part at Jesus’s baptismal event (see Mark 1:11 and parallels). In Judaism it was believed that the king had a special relationship with God, and was in fact adopted by God as his own child at the point of coronation. What is especially interesting about Mark 1:11 is that the second phrase “today I have become your Father” is omitted because Mark does not want to suggest that Jesus was merely adopted as God’s Son at the point of his baptism. Rather, the baptism is the juncture where the Father confirms to the Son the identity he has always had and that will now be publicly revealed. [11]
Die punt wat Witherington vervolgens maak is dat Jesus nie maar net sy verhouding tot God op dieselfde manier beskou het as byvoorbeeld die verhouding wat Koning Dawid met God gehad het nie. Hy verwys dan na Markus 14:36 en hoe dat geen Jood, selfs nie die Ou Testament se konings of priesters nie, tot God as Abba (die Aramese innemende term “my liewe Vader”) sou bid nie. Hierdie feit “openbaar iets spesiaals oor hoe Jesus sy verhouding tot God beskou het” en dat “hy geglo het dat hy ‘n eiesoortige intieme verhouding tot God die Vader gehad het”.
Udo Karsten glip dan ‘n subtiele ad hominem in en sê dat “Esterhuyse Jesus se menslikheid wil beklemtoon en enige Goddelikheid wil ontken,” en dat Esterhuyse die saak “hopeloos ongesofistikeerd benader” (Karsten en “ortodokse Christene” se graad van sofistikering is natuurlik die ware maatstaf). Die gunsteling wisselkarakter (wildcard) word dan gespeel met nog ‘n titseltjie ad hominem, naamlik dat die Inkarnasie en Drie-eenheid nie heeltemal by ons verwysingsraamwerk inpas nie (beroep op misterie), en dat diegene wat ernstig met hierdie sake geworstel het darem sal wéét dat dit so is. Die beroep op misterie sorg dan ook sommer vir die gedagte-beëindigende cliché. Geen van die vrae is beantwoord nie, die Kerk se na-bybelse sofistikering van taal in volksvreemde konsepte word nie-krities as ortodoks aanvaar, en as al jou knersende probleem-oplossigspogins jou ore laat tuit, moet jy liefs jou verlaat op misterie. Dit herinner my aan die gevolgtrekking deur Cambridge professor van Filosofie en Teologie, John Hick, toe hy juis oor hierdie tendens gesê het:
Dit is ‘n mensbedinkte hipotese; en ons kan nie ‘n gebrekkige hipotese red deur dit ‘n Goddelike geheimen te noem nie. [2]
“Udo Karsten glip dan ‘n subtiele ad hominem in…” Kostelik. Maar ek is onbeïndruk en ongeërg deur Jaco van Zyl se triviale beskuldiging. Van Zyl se aksentuering (“wil”) is beuselagtig en ongeoorloof. Daar is geen sinistere insinuasie deur te sê dat Esterhuyse Jesus se menslikheid wil beklemtoon en sy Goddelikheid wil ontken nie. Esterhuyse dink dat Jesus ‘n mens was soos enige ander (dus ‘n gewone mens – maar met geen van die teologiese bagasie daarmee geassosieer wat Van Zyl so bitter graag om my nek wil hang nie) en hy wil dus ‘n bydrae lewer tot beter begrip van wie Jesus was deur te wys op die invloed van “menslike woorde, voorkeure, vooroordele, tradisies en die noodlot van interpretasie” [12]. Ek dink Esterhuyse se projek is ongeslaagd, maar “subtiel ad hominem” in hoe ek oor Esterhuyse praat? Van Zyl is onbeskaamd moedswillig.
Van Zyl voeg by dat ek sê dat Esterhuyse die saak “hopeloos ongesofistikeerd benader”. Ja, ‘n verwysing na Jesus se biologiese verbintenis met God is beslis ongesofistikeerd (eweneens Van Zyl se poging om Athanasius te werf ter ondersteuning). Pogings om teen die Goddelikheid van Jesus of die Drie-eenheidsleer te argumenteer verkry nie kredietwaardigheid deur verwysing na strooipoppe nie. Maar hoe is ‘n waarneming oor die gehalte van argumentering, “subtiel ad hominem”? Verstaan Van Zyl ooit wat ad hominen beteken? (En… het ek sopas nog ‘n subtiele ad hominem gepleeg?!)
Dan bekla Van Zyl die feit (hy noem dit “nog ‘n titseltjie ad hominem” – ‘n handige Latynse term met oneindige toepassingsmoontlikhede?) dat ek verwys na die misterie rakende die natuur van God en dat enigiemand wat erns maak met God dit weet. Hy dink ek maak ‘n beroep op misterie om daarmee Jesus se Goddelikheid of die Drie-enige natuur van God te regverdig. Maar ek doen nie. Ek dink ook nie dat mense net omdat hulle al ernstig met hierdie sake geworstel het, daarom die waarheid beet het nie. Ek het die punt probeer maak dat Esterhuyse in sy verwysing na die “grootste onsin” lyk asof hy God uitgepluis het en dat God skynbaar binne sy verwysingsraamwerk móét pas. [13] ‘n Volledige begrip van God gaan egter die menslike verstand te bowe juis omdat God God is. As daar misterie is in die natuur van God (Van Zyl sal dit sekerlik ook nie van sy eie godsbesgrip ontken nie), hoekom dit nie ook in beginsel verwag met iets soos die Inkarnasie en die Drie-eenheid nie? Weereens, ek beroep my nie op misterie of ortodoksie om die geldigheid van hierdie konsepte te regverdig nie, ek dui bloot aan dat daar misterie te wagte is.
‘n Erkenning van misterie is nie maar net ‘n poging om die ruimte te skep waarbinne teenstrydighede na hartelus versoen kan word soos baie kritici dink nie (daardie gedagte-beëindigende cliché’s waarna Van Zyl verwys). Van Zyl dink (of lê woorde in my mond) dat “die Kerk se grootste denkers oor die saak vir “2000 jaar” nog net op misterie te lande gekom het”. Daar is egter konseptuele modelle [14] (nie maar net analogieë nie) vir ‘n verantwoordelike verstaan van Inkarnasionele en Drie-eenheidskonsepte te midde van misterie en selfs al is hierdie modelle die produk van feilbare menslike refleksie wat probeer sin maak van God se openbaring in die Bybel (terloops, mensbedinkte hipoteses is nie per definisie vals nie).
Behalwe vir die ooglopende blinde kolle in Karsten se artikel, vind ek sy retoriek van self-promofering en herdefiniëring waarlik amuserend. Iemand wat van sy “ortodoksie” verskil het by verstek maar nog nie die saak mooi deurdink nie. Geleerdes ten gunste van “ortodoksie” is die ware kenners, en diegene soos Esterhuyse wat van “ortodoksie” verskil se saak is gewoon minderwaardig. En as die Kerk se grootste denkers oor die saak vir “2000 jaar” nog net op misterie te lande gekom het, het arme Esterhuyse en ander kritiese denkers nie ‘n kat se kans om die enigma uit te werk nie. Om nie eers te praat van sy eg-Calvinistiese lae beskouing van menslikheid nie (vandaar sy beswaar teen die beskrywing van Jesus as gewone mens).
Verblindende vooroordeel en gevoelens van verontregting (hoe durf ek tog praat van ortodoks!) maak dat Jaco van Zyl homself op die ou end maar net nie kon weerhou om oor my karakter te spekuleer [15] met sy verwysing na my sogenaamde “retoriek van self-promofering (sic)” nie. Dis skynbaar vir Van Zyl gans onmoontlik om hom in te dink dat wanneer ek sê dat ortodokse Christene al vir 2000 jaar oor God en Jesus nadink, ek nie op een of ander meerderwaardige manier impliseer dat godsdienstige strominge wat anders dink, nie ook het nie. My punt was dat karikature ‘n bespotting maak van die lang intellektuele tradisie van Christelike ortodoksie. En as ek wys op Esterhuyse se karikatuuragtige uitbeelding van die ortodokse siening van Jesus as seun van God, dan beteken dit nie dat ek dink ek is beter is as hy nie; ek wys bloot op die aard van sy argument. Ek impliseer nie daarmee, soos Van Zyl graag wil (ja, wil) dink dat enigiemand wat van ortodoksie verskil “gewoon minderwaardig” is of dat Ortodokse geleerdes die “ware kenners” is nie. Van Zyl maak sy eie onnadenkende en ongegronde afleidings oor wat my woorde sou impliseer en daarom beleef hy my as self-promoverend.
Feit is dat geen gerespekteerde gesag op die gebied – “ortodoks” of nou nie – al gemeen het dat die ontwikkelde Drie-eenheidsleer, kompleet met sy Twee-Nature verbetering van die Vyfde Eeu deur Jesus of sy vroegste volgelinge as implisiete aanname of eksplisiete dogma geleer is nie. [3] Die Hebraïese wêreld-beskouing het nie ruimte of filosofiese boustene gehad vir so ‘n leer nie. Sonder hierdie konseptuele “roumateriaal” herhaal ek gewoon wat verskeie kenners in die antropologie en die Ou Nabye Oosterse Kultuur vir dekades reeds beaam: die idee dat God en mens verskil in terme van “nature” of “essensies” of dat God ‘n enkele Wese in drie verskillende Persone is, is so volksvreemd dat nie Jesus of die skrywers van die Nuwe Testament hierdie konsepte sonder die grootste weersin sou verwerp het nie. In die Hebraïese verstand kon die Drie-eenheid as niks anders as verdoeselde politeïsme beskou word nie. Geen mate van sentiment of die snoesige herinnering dat ware kenners op die gebied van na-Bybelse dogmatiek die saak al pap gedink het, kan die onbetwisbare weerlê nie.
‘n Beter benadering tot die saak (een waarvoor “ortodoksie” as ‘n reël bittermin verdraagsaamheid gehad het) behoort eerder te wees, wat die Nuwe Testament se beskouing van verloste mensdom was in die lig van die baie hoë agting wat dit aan die mens Jesus geheg het. Wat was die heersende paradigma van die tyd en hoe het hierdie paradigma die taal en beeldspraak omtrent Jesus verklaar? Watter ander figure kom in Tweede-Tempel Tekste voor wat ook onbetwisbaar mens was en niks meer nie? Hierdie en ander vrae word sedert die vroeë Twintigste Eeu deurdringend ondersoek, en die bedreigende implikasies vir “ortodoksie” is, nodeloos om te sê, aanvoelbaar.
Van Zyl stel die vanselfsprekende, want geen ingeligte Christen sal met hom verskil oor wat Jesus of sy vroegste volgelinge eksplisiet geleer het nie. Tog is dit presies hier waar die kar voor die perde gespan word as hy sê dat die “Hebraïese wêreld-beskouing nie ruimte of filosofiese boustene gehad [het] vir so ‘n leer nie”. Sodoende skets Van Zyl ‘n onoorbrugbare kloof tussen die “volksvreemde konsepte” wat by Niceá en Chalcedon uitdrukking gevind het en die woorde wat in die Bybel gebruik word om na Jesus te verwys. Hy praat van “onversoenbaarheid” (soos dit enige goeie unitariër betaam), asof die kerk se belydenisse sommer so uit die lug geval het, met geen aanloop en geen konteks nie. Van Zyl neig sodoende om ‘n karikatuur te skep (“AD HOMINEM! AD HOMINEM!”) van hoe die vroeë Christene geleidelik oor baie dekades heen, met groot worsteling en onder druk van konfrontasie en polemiek, na nuwe woorde en konsepte gesoek het om sin te maak van die mens Jesus van Nasaret soos die Nuwe Testament hom uitbeeld.
Soos reeds genoem is, het Jesus se naaste vertrouelinge, te midde van hul Joodse monoteïstiese verwysingsraamwerk, reeds baie vroeg aan hom eer en aanbidding gebring soos wat toepaslik was vir God self. [16] Dit is dus duidelik dat Jesus sélf die bewegingsmoment was vir hoe mense reeds baie vroeg oor hom begin dink het sowel as vir waarom dit sou voortduur tot in die vierde en vyfde eeue waar geformaliseerde belydenisse oor hom, ten goede of ten kwade, plaasgevind het. Thomas Yoder Neufeld wys op die belangrikste faktore in hierdie bewegingsmoment:
The first impetus, if not in chronological order then perhaps in order of importance, was Easter…A further impetus for Christological development was Jesus himself. Through his words and actions, especially as focused on the kingdom of God, prepared his followers for the Christological explosion that Easter precipitated: With (1) his authoritative and daring announcement in word and deed that God’s reign was appearing, (2) his very intimate and strong bond with God as his father, and (3) his own sense of mission that informed the anticipation of his own death, he left his followers with basic building blocks for their Christological constructions. In other words, Jesus prepared the ground even if at the time, as the evangelists insist, his disciples understood too little of what he was saying or doing. Easter confirmed that Jesus had been right, and thus it precipitated the process of remembering in earnest. [17]
Yoder Neufeld lys dan ook titels en beskrywings wat vir Jesus in Joodse konteks gebruik is [18] en wat as grondslag dien vir vroeë Christologie. Hieroor maak hy die volgende opmerking:
These names are obviously metaphorical or parabolic, used within the euphoria of worship more than as tools of doctrinal precision. They express both veneration and allegiance, both worship and obedience. Each of the titles or names tells a story. None of these titles were invented on the spot to suit Jesus. They all root Jesus’s identity in the traditions and anticipations of Judaism and at the same time make enormous tradition-shattering claims about him. They carry the freight of veneration, hope, and faith, born and nurtured within the long history of suffering and expectation. And, as the movement centered on Jesus as the Christ became more and more open to Gentiles and took hold throughout the Greco-Roman Mediterranean world, these terms of respect, honor, and veneration would take on yet-further hues of meaning. [19]
Terselfdertyd waarsku Yoder Neufeld dat “we should not oversimplify the development from a low Christology to a high Christology or stretch it out over so long a period. Nor should we think in oversimplified terms of a Jewish low Christology and a Gentile high Christology. We might consider low and high quite happily coexisted in the worship life of early communities of Jesus believers.” [20]
As Jesus en wat die Nuwe Testament oor hom getuig, altyd maar weer die verwysingspunt is waarheen ook latere Christene telkens sou terugkeer in hul besinning, al gebruik hulle ook ander taal, dan is Yoder Neufeld reg wanneer hy sê:
We have surveyed a tantalizing mix of designations and titles. Is it any wonder that two and a half centuries later the bishops of the church will have little choice if they want to be true to the New Testament but to declare that Jesus the Christ is both fully human and fully divine? They will argue their case in ways earlier biblical writers do not. The apostles and evangelists express their convictions about Jesus in a way that does not seek philosophical or even theological precision. For them poetry and faithful living are fully adequate. For them it is enough to claim that in the man Jesus, the one whom they knew and followed in Palestine, ate with, suffered with, and whose death they witnessed, they encountered none other than the living God. [21]
Die latere kerk het dus nie maar net in ‘n vakuum gefunksioneer of Grieks filosofiese konsepte uit hulle duime gesuig om ‘n nuwe en vreemde leer oor Jesus te verkondig nie. [22] Eerstens wou hulle beslis getrou wees aan wat hulle van Jesus in die Bybel kon sien en tweedens wou hulle ook getrou wees aan hul hoorders deur op verstaanbare maniere te kommunikeer (soos dit elke nuwe generasie se taak en verantwoordelikheid is). Weer Yoder Neufeld:
Many Christian came to view Jesus as a divine being and therefore as only seemingly human. Others insisted on his humanity and thus felt compelled to downplay his divinity. The creeds of the church were intended to tackle both of these tendencies as inadequate ways of coming to a full appreciation of Jesus…It is difficult to hold these extremes together, but that is the strange and wonderful mix of New Testament Christology and devotion. One without the other –humanity and divinity – renders the early Jesus movement unintelligible. Only by holding them together can we understand why the New Testament writers did not tell us only who Jesus is but also who he was. Stated differently, it is impossible for the evangelists and apostles to tell us who Jesus is as the Christ, the divine Son, without telling us who he was as the man from Nazareth, his life, his death, and his resurrection. Whether their Christological project is faithful to who Jesus was, as I contend, or an imposition on the Jesus of history, as many contemporary Jesus scholars maintain, will continue to be a matter of intense debate. [23]
Die debat woed voort, maar dis bloot kortsigtig of oneerlik om die invloed te ontken van die konteks waarbinne ortodokse Christologie ‘n aanvang gekry het, op latere ontwikkeling. Daar is geen rede om te dink dat daar ‘n onoorbrugbare kloof bestaan tussen eerste eeuse Judaïsme en die Grieks-Romeinse Mediterreense kultuur van die vierde en vyfde eeue nie (sien o.a. Hurtado [24], Witherington [25], Wright [26], Bauckham [27], France [28], Schutter [29]). Natuurlik is daar ‘n breuk van die Christelike kerk met Judaïsme [30], maar dit beteken nie dat ortodokse Christene nie “die heersende paradigma van die [Nuwe Testamentiese] tyd en hoe hierdie paradigma die taal en beeldspraak omtrent Jesus verklaar het” in ag neem nie. Die vrae wat die afgelope dekades oor hierdie sake gevra word en waarna Van Zyl verwys, word inderdaad ondersoek. Maar om te praat van die bedreiging wat hierdie ondersoek kwansuis vir ortodoksie inhou, klink na grootpraterige selfvoldoening.
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Jaco van Zyl stel dat die identiteit van Jesus baie belangrik is [31], en identifiseer homself terselfdertyd “as deel van die Christen-wêreld” en as ‘n “Christelike monoteïs” in korrespondensie aan my van ‘n paar jaar gelede. [32] Van Zyl heg ‘n baie losse betekenis aan die woorde Christen en Christelik, want as die identiteit van Jesus van wie Christene ‘n navolger is, vir hom so belangrik is, dan vind ek sy identifisering vreemd. Vir Van Zyl is Jesus Christus “’n volmaakte wonderbaarlik-verwekte en unieke Mens en Redder – niks minder nie, maar ook niks meer nie”. [33] Vir ortodokse Christendom is Jesus “’n volmaakte, wonderbaarlik-verwekte en unieke Mens, Redder – en God se natuur deelagtig”. Hierdie laaste kwalifikasie is ongetwyfeld die belangrikste belydenis van die ortodokse Christelike tradisie sedert die vroeë kerk daarmee geworstel het. Vir Van Zyl is dit onbybels en verwerplik. Presies waarom iemand soos Van Zyl dan met die Christen-wêreld sou identifiseer is vreemd, veral as Van Zyl sê hy “glo nie aan skanse oprig nie” [34], maar dan ‘n kabaal opskop as iemand homself as ‘n ortodokse Christen identifiseer!
Aan die einde van 2011, twee dae voor Kersfees, het Jaco van Zyl die eerste keer met my kontak gemaak. Hy wou hoor of AntWoord nie ‘n debat met hom wil reël oor Jesus se identiteit nie. Mense in Suid-Afrika is honger vir gesprekke oor geloofskwessies, het hy gemotiveer. Ja, maar ek weet ook dat ‘n mens diskresie aan die dag moet lê met wie jy in gesprek tree. Hoe meer ek daarná oor Jaco van Zyl se styl van argumentering en benadering ontdek het, hoe meer skepties het ek geraak oor hoe sinvol ‘n gesprek met hom kan wees.
Van Zyl se reaksie op my artikel Jesus was ‘n gewone mens, bevestig my vermoede en is aanduidend van hoe ‘n uitnodiging tot gesprek met hom daarna uitsien: ongegronde aannames en afleidings, onnadenkende en moedswillige beskuldigings en retoriese slimmigheid. So dankie, maar nee-dankie.
[1] Met “unitariër” verwys ek na iemand wat glo dat God as ‘n enkele persoonswese bestaan – in teenstelling met ‘n trinitariese godsbegrip van God as drie persone in een wese. Daar is egter ‘n diverse groepering van Unitariese kerke en teologiese strominge, en Van Zyl wil waarskynlik nie met die Unitariese kultus van die Jehova-getuies, waarby hy voorheen aktief betrokke was, geassosieer word nie. Van Zyl verkies die term “Christelike monoteïs” wat egter nie verwar moet word met hoe ortodokse Christene hul godsbegrip soms met trinitariese monoteïsme beskryf juis omdat hulle ook die eenheid van God in drie persone bevestig nie. TERUG
[2] http://worshipingmind.wordpress.com/about/ Waarom vind iemand dit nodig om homself as onortodoks te identifiseer? Ek vermoed dis vir presies dieselfde rede as wat ek myself as ortodoks beskryf: om te dien as ‘n algemene aanduiding van wat jy glo. Ek glo in sekere dinge omdat ek oortuig is uit my studies dat dit is wat die Skrif leer en sodoende identifiseer ek met ander Christene wat oor 2000 jaar dieselfde glo. Van Zyl wil tog met “onortodoks” aandui dat hy sekere van hierdie dinge nie (meer) glo nie (hy noem homself daarom ook ‘n “progressiewe Christen”) en ek aanvaar heeltemal dat hy sal sê hy doen so weens Skrif-oorwegings. TERUG
[3] Ecumenical Christian Creeds TERUG
[4] Sien byvoorbeeld Wikipedia se omskrywings hier en hier. TERUG
[5] Athanasius se De Decretis TERUG
[6] Within these passages and others like them, Paul, like other New Testament writers, uses the phrase “Son of God” to denote Jesus. Later theologians, forgetting their Jewish roots, would of course read this as straightforwardly Nicene Christology: Jesus was the second person of the Trinity. Paul’s usage, though, is much subtler and offers further clues not only as to what earliest Christians believed, but also why. “Son of God” in Jewish thought was used occasionally for angels, sometimes for Israel, and sometimes for the king. These latter uses were influential both in sectarian Judaism (“son of God” is found as a messianic title at Qumran) and in early Christianity. Since the early Christians all regarded Jesus as the messiah of Israel, the one in whom Israel’s destiny had been summed up, it is not surprising, whatever language Jesus had or had not used of himself, that they exploited this phrase (to call it a “title” is perhaps too formal, and too redolent of the wrong way of doing New Testament Christology), which was available both in their Bible and in their surrounding culture, to denote Jesus and to connote his messiahship. (N.T. Wright, “The Divinity of Jesus”, The Meaning of Jesus, p.162) TERUG
[7] We are not saying that if the Bible uses a particular name for God, then anyone else given that name in the Bible must also be God. The Hebrew and Greek words for god and lord, as well as savior, shepherd, rock, and the like, all apply in certain contexts to beings who are neither divine nor objects of religious devotion. Like virtually all words, these words have different meanings in different contexts. Even proper names can have different meanings depending on context…The Bible’s use of various names for Jesus proves that he is God because of their contexts.” (Putting Jesus in His Place, p 128) TERUG
[8] [I] have said enough to indicate, or at least point in the direction of, the remarkable phenomenon at the heart of earliest Christianity. Long before anyone talked about “nature” and “substance,” “person” and “Trinity” the early
Christians had quietly but definitely discovered that they could say what they felt obliged to say about Jesus (and the Spirit) by telling the Jewish story of God, Israel, and the world in the Jewish language of Spirit, Word, Torah, Presence/Glory, Wisdom, and now Messiah/Son. It is as though they discovered Jesus within the Jewish monotheistic categories they already had. The categories seemed to have been made for him. They fitted him like a glove. (N.T. Wright, “The Divinity of Jesus”, The Meaning of Jesus, p.163) TERUG
[9] Sien Marcus Borg se “Jesus and God”, hoofstuk 9 in The Meaning of Jesus TERUG
[10] Marcus Borg, “Jesus and God”, The Meaning of Jesus, p.153 TERUG
[11] Ben Witherington III, “The Son of God”, Evidence for God, p. 155 TERUG
[12] Willie Esterhuyse, God en die gode van Egipte: In die voetspore van die onsienlike, p. 92 TERUG
[13] Sien Jean Oosthuizen se resensie van God en die gode van Egipte by http://152.111.1.87/argief/berigte/rapport/2009/03/14/RH/I/esterhuyse%20geloof.html sowel as Gerda de Villiers se resensie by http://teo.co.za/artikel/articles/204/1/God-en-die-Gode-van-Egipte-deur-Willie-Esterhuyse/Bladsy1.html TERUG
[14] Sien Thomas Morris se The Logic of God Incarnate. Ook Alister McGrath se Christian Theology, Thomas Senor se “The Incarnation and the Trinity” in Reason for the Hope Within, en Paul Copan se “Is the Trinity a Logical Blunder? God as Three and One” en “Did God Become a Jew? A Defense of the Incarnation” in Contending with Christianity’s Critics. William Lane Craig bied ‘n oorsig van die leer van die Drie-eenheid en die Inkarnasie asook ‘n bespreking van sy voorgestelde model van hoe om hierdie leer konseptueel te verstaan: Doctrine of the Trinity (deel 1-8) en Doctrine of Christ (deel 1-8). Terloops, ek vind dit altyd verbysterend hoe skeptici in hul ywer om aspekte van die Drie-eenheid of Goddelike natuur van Jesus te ontken, die mees elementêre foute kan begaan. In ‘n onderhoud op YouTube met Jaco van Zyl het die onderhoudvoerder duidelik ‘n baie beter begrip van wat met een aspek van Jesus se “pre-existence” bedoel word as wat Van Zyl in sy bisarre antwoord laat blyk: Gill: “And then certainly the idea that Jesus was a literally pre-existent being before he came into existence in Mary – that you think really should be talked about carefully.” Van Zyl: “Yeah. That’s, that’s a, that’s a logical dilemma. As much as we kick against the illogic (sic) construct of the trinity. We need to be consistent in our reasoning. We need to also kick against the illogic (sic) construction of this pre-existence. In other words, he existed before he existed! It’s, it’s…it doesn’t, it doesn’t add up – logically doesn’t add up.” (J. Dan Gill Interviews Jaco van Zyl, 47:38 – 48:17) Vir ‘n uiteensetting en verdediging van die Seun van God se “preexistence” sien Douglas McCready se He Came Down from Heaven. TERUG
[15] Your logical fallacy is ad hominem TERUG
[16] However we might assess the success of early Jesus believers in staying true to their Jewish monotheistic moorings, any attempt to understand early Christian language about Jesus will need to wrestle with this issue: post-Easter devotees of Jesus both insisted on the oneness of God and often deliberately applied language traditionally used in relation to this one God to express their respect for and devotion of Jesus – and they did so very soon after Easter. (Thomas Yoder Neufeld, Recovering Jesus, p.293)
But already by Paul’s day something more was in fact going on. “Son of God” came quickly to be used as further way, in addition to the five Jewish ways already available and exploited by the early Christians, of saying that what had happened in Jesus was the unique and personal action of the one God of Israel. It became another way of speaking about the one God present, personal, active, saving, and rescuing, while still being able to speak of the one God sovereign, creating sustaining, sending, remaining beyond. Another way, in fact, of doing what neither Stoicism nor Epicureanism needed to do and paganism in general could not do: holding together the majesty and compassion of God, the transcendence and immanence of God, creation and covenant, sovereignty and presence. (N.T. Wright, “The Divinity of Jesus”, The Meaning of Jesus, p.162) TERUG
[17] Thomas Yoder Neufeld, Recovering Jesus, p. 295-296 TERUG
[18] Lord, Messiah, Son of God, Servant of God, Son of Man, Son of David, Righteous One, Lamb of God, New Adam (True Human), Word, Icon (or Image), Wisdom, High Priest, True Vine, Good Shepherd, Door, Truth, Way, Life, Resurrection (Thomas Yoder Neufeld, Recovering Jesus, p297). TERUG
[19] Thomas Yoder Neufeld, Recovering Jesus, p. 297 TERUG
[20] Thomas Yoder Neufeld, Recovering Jesus, p. 299 TERUG
[21] Thomas Yoder Neufeld, Recovering Jesus, p. 325-326 TERUG
[22] The framers of the orthodox doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity did have an agenda, but it was not to replace a merely human Jesus with a divine Christ. Their agenda was to safeguard the New Testament’s clear teaching of the deity of the Lord Jesus Christ in a way that did equal justice to three other clear teachings of the Bible: there is only one God; Jesus is the Son and the Father; Jesus is also a human being. (Putting Jesus in His Place, p 267) TERUG
[23] Thomas Yoder Neufeld, Recovering Jesus, p.327-328 TERUG
[24] Although the doctrinal reflections on Christ continued and developed over several centuries, the essential steps in treating the exalted Christ as divine were taken while Christianity was still almost entirely made up of Jews and dominated by Jewish theological categories.” (L. W. Hurtado, “The Origins of the Worship of Christ,” Themelios 19/2 (January 1994) : 5.) TERUG
[25] There is continuity between Jesus’ self-understanding, His self-presentation, and the later theologizing that was done about Jesus. They are not identical, but a historical continuum binds these things together. (Ben Witherington, Contending with Christianity’s Critics, p. 112)
There was no evolutionary spiral from low to high Christology in the first century, not even when it came to calling Jesus “God” or “divine Lord.” Indeed, some of the highest Christology is found in some of the earliest documents – Paul’s letters, for example, and from there back to the Aramaic-speaking sources in Jerusalem whence he got some of his ideas. The central ideology of early Christianity about Christ was well in place by the end of the first century, then; it did not first coalesce only after the ecumenical councils of the fourth and fifth centuries, as some have suggested. Despite confusion of Christological images and a plethora of titles in our varying first-century sources, those sources reveal that the inner circle and their co-workers were in general agreement in the first century that Jesus must be worshipped as divine, as well as understood and proclaimed a s a messianic human being. (Ben Witherington III, What Have They Done with Jesus?, p. 287)
To paraphrase Eduard Schweizer, Jesus was the man who fit no one formula, title, or pigeonhole. He chose to reveal his identity in his own way, without trying to conform to the preconceived notions of others. He revealed his divine identity in ways that suited his early Jewish context, not the much later context of the Christological controversies in the fourth and fifth centuries. Our problem today is that we need to read the New Testament texts through early Jewish eyes, not through later eyes of polemical Christian discussions and formulations. When we do so, we will come to the conclusion that Jesus, unique among his contemporaries, chose to reveal his divine nature in his own way, in his own words and in his own good time, and for good measure he came back on Easter Sunday morning to reconfirm these truths to his frightened and flawed disciples. (Ben Witherington III, “Jesus as God”, Evidence for God, p. 159)
It is important to recognize then that it was Jesus’s own use of the term Son of God that set this train of thought in motion, even though it was more fully amplified, explained, and expounded on after Jesus’s death by Paul and various others as the Jesus movement spread west across the empire and increasingly became a gentile phenomenon. (Ben Witherington III, “Son of God”, Evidence for God, p.156) TERUG
[26] This rich seam of Jewish thought is where the early Christians went quarrying for language to deal with the phenomena before them. Some have suggested that it was only when the early church started to lose its grip on its Jewish roots and began to compromise with pagan philosophy that it could think of Jesus in the same breath as the one God. Jewish polemic has often suggested that the Trinity and the incarnation, those great pillars of patristic theology, are sheer paganization. Whatever we say of later theology, this is certainly not true of the New Testament. Long before secular philosophy was invoked to describe the inner being of the one God (and relation of this God to Jesus and to the Spirit), a vigorous and very Jewish tradition took the language and imagery of Spirit, Word, Law, Presence (and/or Glory), and Wisdom and developed them in relation to Jesus of Nazareth and the Spirit…Several of these Jewish themes come together in the famous Johannine prologue. Jesus is here the Word of God; the passage as a whole is closely dependent on the Wisdom tradition and is therby closely linked with the Law and the Presence, or Glory, of God. (N.T. Wright, The Meaning of Jesus, p.160-161)
Thinking and speaking of God and Jesus in the same breath are not, as often has been suggested, a category mistake. Of course, if you start with the deist god and the reductionists’ Jesus, they will never fit, but then they were designed not to. Likewise, if you start with the new age gods-from-below, or for that matter the gods of ancient paganism, and ask what would happen if such a god were to become human, you would end up with a figure very different from the one in the gospels. But if you start with the God of the Exodus, of Isaiah, of creation and covenant, and of the psalms, and ask what that God might look like were he to become human, you will find that he might look very much like Jesus of Nazareth, and perhaps never more so than when he dies on a Roman cross. (N.T. Wright, The Meaning of Jesus, p.167) TERUG
[27] In this argument, the understanding of Jewish monotheism which I have proposed will function as the hermeneutical key to understanding the way in which the New Testament text relate Jesus Christ to the one God of Jewish monotheism. It will enable us to see that the intention of New Testament Christology, throughout the texts, is to include Jesus in the unique divine identity as Jewish monotheism understood it. [The writers] do this deliberately and comprehensively by using precisely those characteristics of the divine identity on which Jewish monotheism focused in characterizing God as unique. They included Jesus in the unique divine sovereignty over all things, they identify him by the divine creation of all things, they identify him by the divine name which names the unique divine identity, and they portray him as accorded the worship which, for Jewish monotheists, is recognition of the divine identity. (Richard Bauckham, God Crucified: Monotheism and Christology in the New Testament, p. 19) TERUG
[28] [E]xplicit use of God-language about Jesus is infrequent in the New Testament, and is concentrated in the later writings…It was such shocking language that, even when the beliefs underlying it were firmly established, it was easier, and perhaps more politic, to express these beliefs in less direct terms. The wonder is not that the New Testament so seldom descries Jesus as God, but that in [a radically monotheistic milieu it does so at all. (R.T. France, “The Worship of Jesus: A Neglected Factor in Christological Debate?” Vox Evangelica 12 (1981): 25.) TERUG
[29] The incarnation first scandalized the Jews, because it threatened their commitment to radical monotheism. Christian Jews, like Paul or John, had to wrestle with the possibility that they were compromising that faith. What is more, the doctrine surely represented an obstacle in the church’s mission to Judaism. Hence, the Jewish leadership of the infant church had to have had very deep convictions about the incarnation or they would have abandoned it. (W.L. Schutter, “A Continuing Crisis for Incarnational Doctrine,” Reformed Review 32.2 (1979): 85.) TERUG
[30] This doctrine [the preexistence of Christ) was not the result of early Christianity’s encounter with Hellenism. It arose out of the early Church’s Jewish roots. Justin Martyr identified the preexistent Christ with the angel of the Lord of the OT, and Novatian concluded that Abraham’s visitor on the eve of Sodom’s destruction was the same preexistent Christ. This is not to say that Jews of the period would have been comfortable with any really preexistent being sharing any measure of deity with God the Father. After all, the claims Christianity makes in conjunction with this doctrine are what made Christianity a different religion from Judaism. (Douglas McCready, “He Came Down From Heaven”: The Preexistence Of Christ Revisited (Pdf-file) TERUG
[31] In korrespondensie van 6 Januarie 2012 sê Van Zyl: “Maar wie God en Christus is, is tog die kern van ons geloof en behoort elke toegewyde Christen die saak te ondersoek en uit te klaar – nie net vanuit ons beskouing nie, maar veral vanuit God s’n.” TERUG
[32] In korrespondensie van 6 Januarie 2012. TERUG
[33] In korrespondensie van 6 Januarie 2012. TERUG
[34] In korrespondensie van 6 Januarie 2012. TERUG
(Die gesprek word voortgesit: Nie alles wat opgedis word, is vir afsluk nie)
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